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The United States government, through the Department of Defense and 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, has established clear 
guidelines that limit the acceptability of orbital debris fragments striking the 
surface of the Earth. This thesis addresses both the survivability of the soon-to-
be-launched NPSAT1 satellite on its eventual reentry into the earth’s 
atmosphere, and any potential risk to the human populace that may result. After 
reviewing the history of tracking objects in space, and the policies in place to limit 
the creation of and risk presented by orbital debris, this research analyzes each 
of NPSAT1’s individual components for its uncontrolled reentry into the earth’s 
atmosphere. The analysis conducted in this paper shows that although a few 
pieces of debris from NPSAT1 would strike the earth’s surface with varying 
degrees of impact energy, these impacts are not expected to exceed the 
standards set forth by the Department of Defense. 
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Since the launch of Sputnik I, Earth’s orbits have been populated by man-
made satellites transmitting military, scientific, and commercial data to their 
respective ground stations below. While some are designed to operate for over 
20 years, these satellites will eventually reach the end of their lifetimes. 
Depending on their orbit, and in compliance with certain United States (U.S.) 
policies, some spacecraft must be removed from their orbital positions and 
properly disposed of by their operators, reducing the potential for an on-orbit 
collision and allowing those positions to become available for other programs. 
This disposal of a satellite is often a decision that is made with respect to the 
specific orbital regime in which it has been operating.  
The orbital regimes surrounding earth are generally divided into three 
sequential regions: Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and 
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) (Figure 1). Satellites operating within LEO, ranging 
from approximately 180 kilometers to 2,000 kilometers (km) in altitude [1], are 
typically disposed of by purposefully injecting the spacecraft back into the earth’s 
atmosphere; a process known as atmospheric reentry. In the MEO and GEO 
regimes (2,000 km to 35,780 km and above [1]), the disposal process involves 
placing the spacecraft into what is known as a disposal orbit, an orbit typically 
300 km above the original. In either case, the spacecraft is drained of its various 
stored energy (e.g., battery charge, stored fuel) to mitigate the possibility of an 
explosion. 
 
Figure 1.  Orbital Regimes by Altitude 
Source [1] R. Holli. (2009, Sept. 4). Catalog of Earth satellite orbits. 
[Online]. NASA. Available: http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/ 
OrbitsCatalog/. 
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The focus of this paper is to quantify the risk to the human populace from 
the uncontrolled reentry of the Naval Postgraduate School’s NPSAT1 spacecraft 
scheduled to launch on 15 September 2016. Designed to operate well within the 
LEO regime at 720 km above the earth, this spacecraft will provide a platform for 
space weather research as well as to demonstrate the ability of several 
experimental subsystems to perform on-orbit. Once the spacecraft has reached 
the end of its orbital lifetime, it will gradually reenter the earth’s atmosphere, 
burning up in the process. Polices written by the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD) require the process of this reentry to be modeled so as to predict the risk, 
if any, there would be to the human population. In this paper, the governing 
policies behind this legislation are highlighted and required analyses are 
performed. 
To solidify the concepts behind the various U.S. policies, the history of 
tracking artificial objects in space, sources and composition of orbital debris, and 
the concepts used by scientists to quantify risk are all addressed. Modeling 
programs, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) 
Debris Assessment Software (DAS) and Orbital Reentry Survival Analysis Tool 
(ORSAT), are also addressed in detail to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the mathematics involved and to highlight how their outputs 
determine a spacecraft’s compliance with U.S. policy. 
The results of the analyses performed for each component of NPSAT1 are 
reported in this thesis along with the context within which to interpret the data. 
Areas for continued research, technical recommendations, and relevant data 






II. ORBITAL DEBRIS 
Orbital debris can be hazardous to operational spacecraft. The first 
collision between a satellite and an orbiting fragment of debris occurred in 1996 
[2]. The Cerise, a 50-kilogram French satellite designed to provide intelligence on 
High Frequency (HF) communications leaving the Earth’s atmosphere, was 
struck by a piece of an Ariane launch vehicle [2]. According to the National 
Space Science Data Center, the Cerise’s six-meter long gravity boom was ripped 
off, leaving it unable to maintain its attitude. In order to prevent the total loss of 
the mission, engineers found a way to re-stabilize the spacecraft by re-designing 
the attitude control software to make use of Cerise’s on-board electromagnets; 
saving the spacecraft and its mission [2]. The form of debris that struck the 
Cerise is not uncommon. Throughout the orbital regimes, there are several types 
of debris that pose risks to orbiting satellites; pieces of debris within the Low 
Earth Orbit may even pose risks to the Earth’s population. 
A. HISTORY OF U.S. SPACE SURVEILLANCE 
An understanding of the kinds of debris and their locations is important. 
Three days before the launch of Sputnik I on 04 October 1957, the United States 
Navy finished the implementation of a space surveillance system that aimed to 
provide critical positioning information of orbiting satellites [3]. Originally designed 
to support the United States’ Vanguard program, the system, dubbed “Minitrack,” 
was named after its primary sensor system: an interferometer station that made 
use of a small oscillator [4]. The Minitrack system consisted of eleven 
internationally positioned optical, radar, and interferometer (Minitrack) stations 
located from San Diego to Havana, Cuba; each providing teletype information to 
the U.S. Navy on the positions of each detected satellites [4]. Minitrack’s opening 
days were not without issue, however. 
Engineers on the project understood that any artificial satellite launched 
into orbit would require the use of a transceiver system for data transmission and 
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commanding. From this concept, the design of an interferometer-based space 
tracking system was born. In principle, these stations use the propagation of a 
signal transmitted from a satellite to determine tracking data from the direction of 
the spacecraft itself. Problems arose, however, when it was discovered that the 
newly launched Russian satellite communicated on a different frequency than the 
Vanguard spacecraft. Interferometer systems determine the target’s direction 
through measuring the difference in phase between two antennas and thus 
tuning a system to operate on the correct frequency is critical. The U.S. Navy’s 
Minitrack system, shown in Figure 2, was designed to operate at 108 Megahertz 
(MHz) while Sputnik I operated at both 20 MHz and 40 MHz [3]. Realizing that 
their system was effectively blind to the Russian satellite, U.S. Navy radio 
engineers outfitted each interferometer station with new oscillators and antennas 
to track the newly launched spacecraft; achieving results within just 1 day [3]. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Minitrack Interferometer Antenna Station 
Source [3]: W. R. Corliss, “Histories of the Space Tracking and Data Acquisition 
Network (STADAN), the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN), and the NASA 
Communications Network (NASCOM),” NASA, Washington, DC. Tech. Rep. 
NASA-CR-140390, Jun. 1974. 
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Given the satellite’s operation within the amateur radio band, a partnership 
was garnered between the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) and 
the Naval Research Lab (NRL). The Smithsonian’s effort, named “Operation 
Moonwatch,” consisted of both scientists and hobbyists alike [3], all relaying 
Sputnik I’s relative positioning data through the Smithsonian and ultimately into 
the Navy’s Minitrack program. This partnership ultimately continued until 1975.  
In a parallel effort, the U.S. Air Force developed a similar system  
named, Program 496L, or “Spacetrack” [5]. Consisting of nearly identical sensor 
systems the key advantages of this system over Minitrack was the number of 
cooperating sites and the ability to track passive satellites with greater accuracy. 
Ephemeris data gained from these stations were compiled by the U.S. Air Force 
and distributed via a bulletin that described the satellites’ paths as they  
crossed the equator. When the redundancy of both systems was recognized,  
the stations for both Minitrack and Spacetrack were joined under the National 
Space Surveillance Control Center (NSSCC) in 1960; 3 years after the launch of 
Sputnik I [6].  
One year later, the NSSCC was transferred to the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). By this time, the Minitrack program 
had evolved through iterative improvements and the program was renamed to 
“Space Surveillance,” or SPASUR, and was still operated by the U.S. Navy. After 
developing the necessary infrastructure to merge the incoming data from both 
systems, NORAD named the combined system the “Space Detection and 
Tracking System” (SPADATS); subsequently, the NSSCC was then named the 
SPADATS Center [6]. 
B. MODERN U.S. SPACE SURVEILLANCE 
Today, up to 29 stations [6] track and observe the presence of man-made 
objects orbiting the earth. Each station is part of a networked system of sensors 
called the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The operation of this system was 
delegated by the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to one of its 
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Component Commands, the Joint Functional Component Command for Space 
(JFCC-Space). Headquartered in Vandenberg Air Force Base, the JFCC, 
through the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), reports that the SSN has 
catalogued over 39,000 man-made objects since the launch of Sputnik I and is 
currently tracking more than 16,000 objects on a daily basis. USSTRATCOM 
reports that of those 16,000 objects, only 5% of them have been classified as 
functional spacecraft. The remaining 95% of these objects have been classified 
as orbital debris [6]. 
Similar to the variations before it, the SSN incorporates a variety of sensor 
systems. Consisting of both conventional and phased-array radar systems, 
advanced electro-optical telescopes, and a satellite currently in orbit, the SSN is 
capable of making over 380,000 observations a day [6]; enabling the United 
States to maintain a database of each satellite in orbit. With locations ranging 
from an atoll in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) to Thule, Greenland, the SSN 
provides operators with a global situational awareness capability. Although 
29 stations participate in the activities of the SSN, many of them perform 
functions for other programs as well. With only 7 of the 29 stations being fully 
dedicated to the Space Surveillance Network, the system must use a predictive 
approach when tracking spacecraft [5]. 
When a spacecraft is launched, the Joint Space Operations Center 
predicts where that satellite will be and then tasks the SSN to search for the 
object [7]. Once a sensor discovers the satellite, the station performs 
measurements and observations on the spacecraft’s trajectory and then relays 
the information back to the JSpOC. From the information received from the SSN, 
the JSpOC estimates the orbital parameters of the spacecraft and uses that 
prediction as the baseline entry for the object. As the spacecraft orbits the earth, 
the SSN is tasked to search for it in the newly predicted location and update the 
spacecraft’s entry if there is a deviation from the calculated trajectory and the 
actual path [7]. This cycle repeats itself until the orbital parameters of the 
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spacecraft have been accurately characterized; after which the SSN performs 
periodic searches for the object. 
The entries generated from the process above are then collated into a 
large central database maintained by the JSpOC. This database, known as the 
“U.S. Space Catalog,” describes every man-made object that has orbited the 
earth since 1957. Each object in the catalog is represented by an individual entry 
composed of 25 elements [8]. These references are known by the community as 
two “Two Line Element” (TLE) sets; named for the way that data is organized 
within the entry itself.  
TLE data is organized into three ultimate lines with the first line containing 
only one point of information: the object’s reference name. The second line 
contains the known or calculated mission parameters of the satellite (e.g., Epoch 
information, classification of the satellite, ephemeris type). The third line contains 
orbital information necessary for researchers to calculate the object’s position in 
space [9]. The TLE entry for NOAA 14, a weather satellite operated by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), is provided in Table 1 
as an example and an explanation of each data point is given in Appendix C. 
Various iterations of the TLE format have been implemented since its inception, 
each marked by the perturbation model used for calculations. 
Table 1.   Two Line Element (TLE) Entry for NOAA 14 
NOAA 14        
1 23455U 94089A   97320.90946019  .00000140  00000–0  10191–3 0  2621 
2 23455  99.0090 272.6745 0008546 223.1686 136.8816 14.11711747148495 
 
Source [9]: NORAD NOAA elements. (n.d.). CelesTrak. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.celestrak.com/NORAD/elements/noaa.txt. 
As the SSN uses a predictive approach to track orbiting objects, the 
system must have the ability to accurately model spacecraft’s movement in 
space; accounting for both atmospheric drag and for the shape of the Earth [10]. 
The speed by which the Earth rotates causes the planet to stretch outward near 
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the equator. The factor by which the planet stretches is known as oblateness. 
When oblateness is considered, the trajectories of the spacecraft are perturbed. 
To model the affects these perturbations have on the satellites orbiting Earth, 
NORAD produced a modeling algorithm known as the Simplified General 
Perturbation (SGP) model in 1960 [11]. This code, and the variants that followed, 
allow both NASA and DOD researchers to predict a spacecraft’s position in orbit 
at any given time. To better aid spacecraft systems operating in LEO, the latest 
iteration of the TLE format makes use of SGP4 code (developed 10 years after 
SGP) to achieve a higher degree of positioning accuracy [11]. Even with this 
improvement, however, many spacefaring agencies have lamented [12] that the 
orbital positions calculated through the use of TLE information can lead to 
positioning errors in the magnitude of kilometers in LEO. 
C. CONJUNCTION ANALYSIS AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE 
With roughly 3,700 active satellites in orbit, assessing the likelihood of a 
collision each day between any two of these spacecraft, or with the remaining 
12,900 catalogued items of space debris [13], is not trivial. It is to this end that 
conjunction analyses are performed when a close approach between two orbiting 
objects is expected. “Conjunction analysis” is the process of marrying the 
calculated locations of two satellites with the inherent uncertainties of their 
position data to predict the exact time of closest approach. As each calculation 
involves only the two satellites, or the one “pair,” similar analyses must be made 
daily for nearly every single satellite on orbit. If it is determined that two satellites 
will pass by each other with an unacceptable clearance (defined by the ovoid 
shapes that result from the satellites position data and uncertainty), engineers 
and operators must make a determination as to what the next steps should be. 
For a satellite traveling faster than 7.8 km/s, changing orbital trajectory is 
not a simple feat. Once it is determined that the trajectories of two satellites will 
pass as close as 1,000 meters from each other, the JSpOC produces a 
Conjunction Summary Message (CSM). These messages include such data as 
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the time of closest approach, the estimated distance by which the two objects will 
pass, the passing speed of the object relative to the spacecraft, and the relative 
position and velocity of the object [14]. Satellite operators must then perform a 
series of analyses on the data to determine whether an avoidance maneuver is 
required. While the conjunction assessments leading to the generation of CSMs 
are performed 6 to 7 days in advance, operators are often only notified 3 days 
prior to the projected time of closest approach [15]. 
If the data contained within the CSM yields an unacceptable risk to the 
satellite program, the spacecraft operators may take an action known as a 
Collision Avoidance (COLA) maneuver. The decision to perform such a 
maneuver is often a complex process involving collating each reported 
conjunction event, quantifying the probability of collision, and then qualifying the 
risk to both the spacecraft and its mission [16]. If the probability of a collision is 
too great or the risk to the mission is deemed unacceptable, operators will 
program the spacecraft to perform a series of thrust maneuvers to avoid the 
oncoming satellite altogether. The reality of performing these analyses, however, 
is often further convoluted.  
Accuracies of individual Conjunction Summary Messages are constrained 
through two elements: inaccuracies inherent to the TLE entries and the statistical 
methods used in determining the probability of a collision [17]. One of the key 
processes involved in performing a conjunction assessment is the determination 
of the probability of collision. To calculate this metric, it must be assumed that the 
distribution of uncertainty an object’s position in space is Gaussian by nature. 
Though sufficient for calculations with frequently updated TLEs, evidence has 
shown that conjunctions computed more than 3 days in advance induce an 
angular error of 5-degrees or more [17]. Considering the positioning and 
statistical errors associated with the use of CSM data, operators must also 
consider the possibility that changing the orbital trajectory of their spacecraft 
would result in yet another conjunction event; restarting the process. 
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D. CURRENT DEBRIS ENVIRONMENT 
Orbital debris is comprised of three categories or types: non-operational 
satellites and rocket bodies, mission-related debris, and fragmented satellites 
[18]. Once a satellite becomes unresponsive, or non-operational, little can be 
done to correct its trajectory. Whether it is the result of a power failure, faulty 
propulsion system, or a processor fault, the spacecraft effectively becomes 
another piece of debris to be cataloged. Debris like this can be found in each 
orbital regime but its potential impact to operations in LEO is of great concern. As 
these spacecraft are typically unable to perform COLA maneuvers when 
necessary, collisions with these spacecraft—or any other object in space—could 
leave a devastating legacy. 
On 10 February 2009 (16:56 ZULU), an Iridium communications satellite, 
Iridium 33, collided with a disabled Russian military satellite, “Космос-2251,” 
above the Siberian Taymyr Peninsula [19]. Conjunction analyses estimated that 
the two satellites would pass each other by a half-kilometer. Though the 
magnitude of error within the CSM is not uncommon, the Iridium operators 
elected not to take action to avoid the collision or mitigate its probability. 
Approximately 770 km above the Earth, the two spacecraft collided at 10 km/s 
releasing over 1,500 fragments of trackable debris into the Low Earth Orbit [20] 
and an unknown quantity of debris too small to track. As of 2014, only 24% of the 
approximately currently cataloged 2,000 items of debris generated from the 
collision of these two spacecraft had reentered the Earth’s atmosphere [21]; 
leaving the remaining 76% of fragments to be navigated by satellites operating in 
adjacent orbits.  
Two years prior to the incident above, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) launched their first successful Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) on 11 January 
2007 [22]. The KVV, a weapon designed to disable its target through the use of 
kinetic energy, impacted one of their own Fengyun-series weather satellites, FY-
1C, in a test of the weapon’s capabilities. The spacecraft was operating in a low-
Earth polar orbit; an orbital trajectory favored by both weather and intelligence 
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satellites. The PRC’s demonstration proved to the world they had the ability to 
target and successfully impact military reconnaissance satellites. The 
demonstration of their KVV program generated an additional 3,000 items of 
trackable debris into the LEO regime; more than any single event since the start 
of space exploration [22].   
On 16 October 2012, the upper stage of an International Launch Services 
Proton Breeze M (Briz-M) rocket exploded with its two payloads still in tow. The 
rocket was supposed to transport two communications satellites, one Indonesian 
and the other Russian, into their intended Geostationary Orbits [23]. The rocket 
idled shortly after its launch on 06 August 2012 once one of its planned engine 
burns failed to ignite. Unable to burn off the remaining fuel, the spacecraft 
exploded 2 months later with more than half of its hydrazine and nitrogen 
tetroxide supply onboard. The explosion generated over 500 new items of debris 
into the Low Earth Orbit [23]. 
Though they are certainly the most dramatic events, system failures or 
collisions are not the only sources of orbital debris. The processes involved in the 
launch, deployment, and initialization of a satellite can each generate various 
forms of debris. Ranging from explosive bolts used in spring-release systems 
propelling spacecraft away from a rocket’s upper-stage, to the expulsion of lens 
caps, this type of debris is smaller in nature and strictly refuse. Assessing the risk 
presented by this category of debris is often difficult as modern tracking systems 
can only identify the larger items within this subset. 
Comparatively small in dimension, collisions with these forms of debris 
can still result in mission failures. The standard formula for calculating the Kinetic 
Energy of an object has been solved in Equation 1 for an object with a diameter 
of 10 cm (the typical size of the smallest tracked objects [24]) traveling at a 
velocity of 7.8 km/s. Assuming the object’s mass is 20 grams, and that all of its 
energy will be transferred to the spacecraft at an orthogonal trajectory, the 
equation shows the energy released from the impact would be equivalent to that 
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of an impact with a mid-size sedan traveling approximately 80.46 km/s, or 50 
miles per hour.   
  221 1  20 7800  608,400 2 2 mKE mv g Jouless        (1) 
Equation 1: Kinetic Energy equation solved for specific values 
E. KESSLER SYNDROME 
Faced with the increased generation of debris, NASA scientist Donald 
Kessler described an event-driven concept for the future of orbital operations. In 
essence, after a collision between two objects occurs on-orbit, the debris from 
the collision will propel outward into adjacent orbits; increasing the probability of 
another collision. This trend will continue on an event-by-event timeline until the 
probability of a collision between two objects renders the orbit unusable. To that 
end, several U.S. policies have been enacted to take immediate steps in limiting 
the generation of additional debris; protecting future satellites and limiting the 
actuality of “Kessler’s Syndrome” [25]. 
Addressing both the potential for collisions and U.S. policy as a whole, 
satellite designers have employed a variety of debris mitigation schemes. Some 
of these schemes are active, utilizing on-board thrusters to reposition the 
spacecraft, while others are passive, sheltering the spacecraft with specialized 
shields designed to absorb hypervelocity impacts with debris. Other methods aim 
to reduce the risk of on-orbit explosions. The methods employ mechanisms to 
deplete the spacecraft of all stored forms of energy upon disposal and designing 
battery housings to capture fragments from a potential exploding battery cell. In 
the design of NPSAT1’s battery system, an aluminum housing encases the 
batteries [26]. This housing was then outfitted with a pressure relief valve and 
placed in-line with a filter to ensure that if an explosion did occur, it would be 
contained within NPSAT1. At the end of its mission, the battery system will be 
drained of all of its energy, an act known as passivation, to further prevent the 
possibility of an explosion [26]. 
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F. ATMOSPHERIC REENTRY AND CONCEPTS 
To determine which components of a satellite will ablate upon atmospheric 
reentry, researchers rely on specific formulas and modeling software to predict 
the failure of each component. In 1994 [27], scientists from both Lockheed 
Engineering & Services Company and NASA’s Johnson Space Center proposed 
a way of modeling the risk of casualty from satellite reentry at a conference of the 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) seeking to quantify the 
survivability of spacecraft components reentering the Earth’s atmosphere.  
To model the risk to the world’s population from reentering space debris, a 
formula can be used to relate the probability of impact, the possible locations of 
impact, the population density of that swath area, and sum of the cross-sectional 
areas of each object expected to impact the surface of the Earth. To be 
conservative, the authors opted to add an additional buffer of approximately 
0.3 meters around the border of each object’s calculated cross-sectional area. 
The resultant formula is shown in Equation 2 [27]. 
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Equation 2: Expected Number of Casualties from Reentering Debris 
 
The equation above requires the user to know each component’s 
probability of impacting the Earth’s surface, the cross-sectional area of each 
fragment, and the population density in the area of impact. The first two values 
can be obtained through software modeling and computer aided design (CAD) 
measurements. Beyond those data points, scientists must reference global 
population data, group the densities by latitude, and then account for the orbital 
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inclination of the satellite; a factor that directly correlates to the flight path of the 
falling debris. Though several databases exist for global census and population 
data, achieving resolution for latitudinal population distributions 25 years in 
advance requires two different sources: the International Data Base (IDB) and 
the Gridded Population of the World (GPW). The IDB, a product of the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, contains historical and current data for the global 
population while also estimating future growth [28]. The GPW spatially distributes 
populations with respect to latitude and longitude [28]. Both databases are 
necessary when estimating the impact area of fallen debris at the spacecraft’s 
end-of-life.  
When considering the beginning stages of spacecraft design, the risk 
presented in Equation 2 can be quantitatively understood before an analysis is 
performed. If a researcher were to assume that each component they were 
designing failed to ablate after reentering the Earth’s atmosphere, a highly 
conservative risk assessment could be made. Considering the design of 
NPSAT1, if two objects were thought to have the ability to survive reentry, 
Equation 2 could be solved to provide an initial risk assessment. Equation 3 [27] 
solves Equation 2 [27] under the assumption that the reentering components 
have cross-sectional areas of 0.016 m2 and 0.00108 m2, respectively; both items 
falling into the same densely populated with identical impact areas (all assumed 
values are shown in Equation 3): 
    2 
#
2     0.6 ref
Objects
NExpected Numberof Causalities E P A
A
m
            (3) 
   2 2 2 211 2
5
32,375,525 0.6 0.6 0.016 0.6 0.00108










Equation 3: Expected Number of Casualties (Solved) 
 
Due to the linearity of the equation, relationships between the expected 
number of casualties and each of the variables can be understood. For instance, 
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if the predicted land mass to be impacted is larger, it becomes less and less 
likely that a casualty will occur. If that area were to contain a significant populous 
density, then the expected number of casualties will increase. In both cases, it 
can also be realized that the mass of the reentering object serves to amplify its 
impact as well as increase the risk of injury to the people living down below. 
The risk to human life posed by spacecraft and debris reentering the 
Earth’s atmosphere needs to be fully understood before a program can launch 
into orbit. To this end, numerous government organizations have developed 
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III. U.S. POLICY ON ATMOSPHERIC REENTRY  
AND DEBRIS 
The Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC Space), a 
component of USSTRATCOM, continues to catalog new objects on a daily basis. 
With the number and density of orbital debris increasing, spacefaring agencies 
across the world, both civil and military, have implemented regulations and 
procedures to address the generation of even more debris. Since the inception of 
the Kessler Syndrome, debris mitigation has increasingly become a relevant 
topic and design constraint for the modern spacecraft. This relevancy is further 
emboldened when considering the debris reentering the Earth’s atmosphere. The 
following subchapters of this paper highlight three avenues of U.S. administrative 
policies regarding the commercial, civil, and defensive use of space; each 
combining to illustrate the commitment of the United States to the mitigation of 
orbital debris and human safety. 
A. COMMERCIAL POLICIES 
The combination of both the Commercial Space Launch Act (Public Law 
98–575) of 1984 and the Commercial Space Act (Public Law 105–303) of 1998 
designated the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) as the responsible 
federal agency for both the enablement and regulation of commercial space 
launches and reentries [29]. Currently, the DOT further delegates this function to 
the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation, endowing the agency with the responsibility of regulating any 
commercial space transportation activity conducted within the United States or by 
a U.S. citizen [29]. 
Through the regulation of 238 launches since 1989 [30], the FAA 
developed its own criteria for the safe reentry of commercial vehicles. Whether or 
not the rocket body or spacecraft was designed for reusability, the FAA lays out 
the same stipulations as to the safety measures required for commercial 
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programs to operate in space. These requirements, along with laws governing 
the entire U.S. government, are detailed in Chapter 3 of the Title 14 Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) [31]. 
One such commercial entity governed by this document is SpaceX. The 
design of the company’s Falcon Heavy rocket, the same launch vehicle chosen 
for the NPSAT1 satellite, chooses to return the first stage of the rocket back to its 
originating launch pad for reuse. Among the numerous safety requirements that 
are levied upon SpaceX by the CFR and FAA, the most applicable regulation to 
the context of this paper involves the return of its first stage and its potential risk 
to the human population along its return path. In summary of the requirement 
quoted below, the stage’s reentry should neither pose a probability of casualty 
greater than 1:10,000 to any one human, nor pose a greater than 30:10,000 
probability of casualty to the public as a whole [31]. 
(i) For public risk, the risk level to the collective members of the 
public exposed to vehicle or vehicle debris impact hazards 
associated with a proposed mission does not exceed an expected 
average number of 0.00003 casualties per mission (or Ec [casualty 
expectation] criterion of 30 × 10-6) to members of the public from 
the applicant’s proposed activity; and 
(ii) For public risk, the risk level to an individual does not exceed 
.000001 per mission (or individual risk criterion of 1 × 10-6). [31] 
B. CIVIL POLICIES 
Arguably the most recognized authority in space exploration, the civilian 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration has been a leading voice in 
mitigation of orbital debris and space safety. Taking the international lead in this 
effort, NASA created the Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO). Operating from 
NASA’s Johnson Space Center, this office is the primary organization 
responsible for both assessing and mitigating the threat posed by orbital debris. 
To that end, the ODPO authored three documents by which NASA 
spacecraft programs should adhere to: NASA Standard (NASA-STD) 8719.14A, 
Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8715.6A, and Handbook (NHBK) 8719.14. The 
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current revisions, authored on 8 December 2011, 14 May 2009, and 30 July 
2008, respectively, combine to set in place both laws and best practices for 
program managers and engineers alike to protect spacecraft from and limit the 
generation of orbital debris.  
NASA Standard 8719.14A, Process for Limiting Orbital Debris, establishes 
a multitude of requirements aimed at the reduction of generated debris, modeling 
the probability of collisions (both known and unknown), and modeling the risk that 
reentering debris will pose to the human population below. This document has 
become a required set of design, planning, and execution requirements for all 
NASA programs through the adoption of NPR-8715.6A [32]. Beyond mandating 
that any and all space-destined programs strictly adhere to the requirements set 
forth in NASA-STD-8719.14A, this document also provides information on the 
data required to satisfy each requirement and the timeframes by which technical, 
programmatic, and mission data should be disseminated. 
To help designers navigate through these requirements, NASA authored 
handbook 8719.14, the Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris. Intended to both 
educate and enable engineers and program managers, NHBK 8719.14 provides 
background on the history of orbital debris mitigation and its impact through 
useful figures and data analyses collected across multiple missions. Specifically 
referenced in this document are two software programs: the Debris Assessment 
Software (DAS) and the Orbital Reentry Survival Analysis Tool (ORSAT) [5]. 
These two programs, discussed in a later subchapter, are the only recognized 
modeling programs for determining a program’s compliance with particular 
technical requirements within NASA-STD-8719.14A [5]. DAS provides its users 
with the ability to input mission and design data into the program and confirm 
their spacecraft’s compliance with ten different requirements called out within  
the NASA standard. The compliance with each of these requirements, ranging 
from predicting the probability of an accidental collision with another object 
(Requirement 4.5–1) to the determination of which components will survive 
reentry (Requirement 4.7–1) [32], are reported back to the user through a 
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Boolean indicator within the GUI. ORSAT focuses more specifically on the 
modeling of reentering spacecraft and component survivability. 
C. MILITARY POLICIES 
Responding to the President of the United States’ growing concern [33] of 
the impact posed by orbital debris, the U.S. Department of Defense released 
their own instruction set similar to NASA’s Procedural Requirement 8715.6A and 
Standard 8719.14A. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3100.12, titled 
Space Support, implements policies and guidelines for operating military space 
programs and assigns roles and responsibilities to several agencies. Specifically, 
the DODI assigns the responsibility of transporting, launching, operating both 
rockets and spacecraft to the U.S. Air Force. 
The U.S. Air Force, now acting as the military’s executive agent for space 
operations, published their own instruction set, known as an Air Force Instruction 
(AFI), to augment the directives set by the Department of Defense. Entitled the 
Space Safety and Mishap Prevention Program, Air Force Instruction 91–217 
itemizes the specific requirements military programs should comply with [24]. 
NPSAT1, as a DOD satellite is subject to both of these instructions. 
Among the requirements levied upon military spacecraft, two outputs are 
required to demonstrate a program’s compliance with debris mitigation: a Space 
Debris Assessment Report (SDAR) and the End-of-Life Plan (ELOP) [24].  
The current revision of the AFI (11 April 2014) combines both of these 
documents into one report, hereafter referred to as the “SDAR/EOLP,” which 
spacecraft programs must submit before critical launch milestones—namely, 
before both the Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews and before the Flight 
Readiness Review. Though this document requires spacecraft programs to 
provide a vast amount of information about their design, the successful 
completion of the SDAR/EOLP requires these designers to perform several 
analyses to demonstrate that their program is in full compliance with both AFI 
91–217 and DODI 3100.12.  
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NASA’s standards and the DOD’s instructions were born from a response 
to the same mandate, Presidential Directive 49: National Space Policy [32], [33]. 
In 1996, President Clinton declared that the U.S. government, to include both the 
DOD and NASA, will actively seek to minimize the generation of orbital debris 
and take a lead international role in the development of mitigation polices. From 
this directive, the U.S. government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices 
(ODMSP) was established. Relatively small in length at only three pages, the 
ODSMP established that every U.S. spacefaring program must plan for and 
assess the risk of orbital debris in four major areas: the intentional release of 
debris, accidental explosions, orbital flight paths, and post-mission disposal [34]. 
As mitigation practices and policies matured, the instruction sets of each 
agency became increasingly similar. With the exceptions of administrative and 
operational differences, the requirements specific to mitigating orbital debris are 
functionally identical between the DOD and NASA. In regard to the reentry of 
NPSAT1, two excerpts are given below; one from AFI 91–217 and the other 
NASA-STD-8719.14A. Both requirements address the probability of casualty to 
human life from reentering debris. 
The collective risk to the general public due to uncontrolled 
atmospheric reentry shall not exceed a casualty expectation (Ec) of 
100 x 10-6 (one hundred in one million). Requirement 5.7.3.1.1.1 of 
[24] 
a. For uncontrolled reentry, the risk of human casualty from 
surviving debris shall not exceed 0.0001 (1:10,000). Requirement 
4.7–1 (4.7.2.1) of [32] 
Both requirements state identical limitations for the acceptable level of risk 
reentering spacecraft can pose to humanity. Though particularly beneficial for 
safety, the harmonizing of these critical requirements can prove beneficial to 
mission planners and developers. Uniformity between these documents on the 
matter of orbital debris allows both DOD and NASA engineers to use DAS as a 
compliance analysis tool. This ability saves overall program cost, resources, and 
limits the possibility of human error. While DAS does not reference U.S. Air Force 
 22
requirements, the combined SDAR/EOLP requires military programs to use DAS 
as an analytics tool to verify the compliance of several requirements stipulated 
throughout AFI 91–217. For reference, a comparison of the requirements able to 
be satisfied through DAS for both documents has been provided in Appendix D. 
D. ATMOSPHERIC REENTRY MODELING 
Originally developed in 1998, NASA’s Debris Assessment Software [35] 
was designed to provide program managers and engineers with a quick  
and conservative assessment tool [36]. In the latest revision, version 2.0.2,  
DAS enables the user to verify the design of their spacecraft along ten  
different requirements specified within NASA Standard 8719.14A 
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/das.html. Either through the import of a 
comma-separated-value (CSV) file or through manual input, operators of the 
software can account for each component of the spacecraft’s mass, material 
properties, size, and relative shape [36]. These components can be organized 
either as a hierarchical, nested, design or as individual pieces. 
DAS functions as a component- or object-oriented analysis program in 
that the program considers the reentry of each individual piece of the spacecraft 
rather than the spacecraft’s reentry as a whole. Several technical assumptions 
must be taken into account when using a component-oriented program such as 
DAS. If the satellite is no longer considered to be whole, then an initial break-up 
altitude must be assumed by which each detailed component will be introduced 
into the Earth’s atmosphere for reentry. As the majority of spacecraft reentering 
the atmosphere begin to decay around 72 to 84 km above the surface, DAS 
assumes this initial breakup altitude to be the mean of this range, 78 km. In 
addition to assuming an initial altitude, the software also assumes that each 
detailed piece of the reentering satellite behaves as a standalone component. 
As a spacecraft reenters the Earth’s atmosphere, it is introduced to a great 
amount of heat. Aerodynamic drag heats the outer aluminum sheath to a point at 
which it begins to ablate. It is well understood that as the outer metal housing is 
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heated, it will then transfer that energy in the form of radiated heat and energy  
to neighboring components. Thus the inner components of the spacecraft have 
already been exposed to significant heat before they are physically exposed  
to the Earth’s atmosphere. DAS assumes that while the spacecraft undergoes 
this process, the heat generated from reentry is not transferred between parent 
and child components. In fact, once a parent structure ablates, its child 
components are exposed to an assumed atmosphere of 300 Kelvin; 
approximately 80 degrees-Fahrenheit. This approach illustrates the conservative 
nature of DAS.  
DAS’ conservative logic can lead to “false positives,” suggesting that 
certain components will fall to the Earth’s surface when they would actually 
ablate upon reentry. This conservatism is helpful though when considering that 
DAS is programmed to confirm the compliance of each spacecraft with ten 
different NASA requirements. Confirming that the probability of collision with 
objects on-orbit is within required limits, that there is less than a 1:10,000 chance 
of a spacecraft causing a fatality upon reentry, and assessing the impact that any 
mission-related debris would cause within the LEO orbit are all calculations that 
can be made; the output of each yielding whether their program is compliant or 
not. It is for this reason that DAS’ conservative approach is valuable: if a program 
were to be found compliant through DAS, no further analysis would be 
necessary. Thus DAS ultimately could save time and mission resources 
throughout the design process. 
If a program’s spacecraft were to fail, further analysis would need to occur 
in a program capable of higher fidelity results. NASA’s Object Reentry Survival 
Analysis Tool is the organization’s primary resource in the realistic prediction of a 
spacecraft’s ability to survive the reentry process; albeit a spacecraft or launch 
vehicle. Unlike DAS, this tool aims to tackle only the requirement pertaining to 
atmospheric reentry laid out by NASA Standard 8719.14A [22].  
ORSAT makes use of a variety of models (trajectory, thermal, 
atmospheric, aerodynamic, and aerothermodynamic) to compute the risk of 
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impact. The program also accounts for material’s properties changing with 
respect to temperature; allowing researchers to model reentering components as 
either a lumped mass (equivalent to DAS) or with heat conduction. DAS is often 
preferred to ORSAT as an initial tool as it is publically available and can be 
operated with a minimal amount of training. 
Whether entering data into DAS or ORSAT, components can only be 
represented as one of four shapes: a flat plate, a box, a cylinder, or a sphere. For 
equipment and components that do not resemble one of these four geometries, 
an equivalent structure must be created within the program. These structures 
must exhibit the same thermal mass, appropriate dimension according to both 
the weight and density of the material, and resemble one of the allowable 
shapes. Once every component of the spacecraft has been correctly accounted 
for within either program, the analysis can be performed. 
 25
IV. SPACECRAFT OVERVIEW 
The NPSAT1 satellite, illustrated in Figure 3, was developed by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) to provide a platform for both higher education of 
officers and a testbed for experimental payloads. The education of military 
officers within the Space Systems Operations and Space Systems Engineering 
curricula is accomplished through the design, building, testing and evaluation of 
each sub-system. This level of testing directly translates to quality platforms by 
which the various experiments on-board can be evaluated for further research. 
Once on orbit, NPSAT1 will provide operators with information on the space 
weather as well as provide data to aid research in ionospheric physics [26]. 
A. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AND LAUNCH PARAMETERS 
NPSAT1 will launch from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) to 
an operational altitude of 720 km [26]. The one-meter tall cylindrical dodecagon 
will make use of two experiments furnished by the Naval Research Laboratory 
and will also house several experiments designed by NPS to demonstrate  
the flight-readiness of their respective technologies. Weighing 82 kg, Table 2 
classified NPSAT1 as a microsatellite [32] and, given its dimensions, is allowed 
to be launched from a specialized payload adapter developed by the Space Test 
Program (STP). This adapter acts as a multi-vehicle transport system; being able 
to launch multiple smaller satellites in parallel with the launch vehicle’s main 
payload. As the rocket booster propels its primary spacecraft into orbit, this 
adapter ring would allow NPSAT1 to be ejected into an orbital inclination of 




Figure 3.  Expanded View of NPSAT1 
Source: This image was provided courtesy of Daniel Sakoda of the Space 




Table 2.   Small Satellite Categories by Wet Mass 
Satellite Class Qualifying Wet Mass (kg) 
Minisatellite 100 kg to 500 kg 
Microsatellite 10 kg to 100 kg 
Nanosatellite 1 kg to 10 kg 
Picosatellite 0.1 kg to 1 kg 
Source [32]: Process for Limiting Orbital Debris, NASA Standard 8719.14A, 
2008. 
B. COMMAND AND DATA HANDLING SUBSYSTEM 
The spacecraft’s ability to process commands, manage the flow of data 
between subsystems, and provide for data storage functionality lies within the 
Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem. The CD&H is comprised of 
several printed circuit boards (PCB) stacked on top of each other; each having a 
common interface between them. The operating system for this subsystem was 
developed in Linux given the platforms flexibility, support for multitasking, and 
comes freely available. 
C. ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM 
While on orbit, NPSAT1 will be powered by 36 solar panels covering the 
twelve aluminum sides of the spacecraft. Each side houses three solar panels 
each: two commercially available solar panels and a one experimental solar 
panel. Each of these panels are made up of triple-junction solar cells, providing 
enough energy to charge 49 lithium-ion cells that make up the NPSAT1 battery. 
The battery is configured with seven lithium-ion cells in series and seven strings 
of these cells in parallel; providing the spacecraft with 225 Watt-Hours [26] of 
energy storage. Each of the series strings of cells has a current sensor that 
allows spacecraft operators to monitor the battery use from downloaded 
telemetry. 
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D. ATTITUDE AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM 
For attitude control while on-orbit, NPSAT1 makes use of three magnetic 
torquer coils, or air coil wires. Torquer coils are windings of copper wire, 
designed in such a way to behave as magnets. NPSAT1’s torquer coils have 
been implemented to leverage the magnetic field of the Earth to orient the 
spacecraft while on orbit. These coils, combined with a magnetometer, and a 
controller, make up the spacecraft’s Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS). As the 
spacecraft orbits the Earth, the ACS will measure the readings from the 
magnetometer. The spacecraft command and data handler (CDH) runs the 
attitude control algorithm, using the spacecraft’s location and a look-up table of 
the Earth’s magnetic field to determine a preferred magnetic field vector. It then 
compares the preferred magnetic field vector with that measured by the 
magnetometer to determine its pointing error. The CDH then commands the ACS 
controller to align these two values by varying current to the torquer coils; using 
magnetic control to position the spacecraft to within ±10° of the correct 
orientation. 
E. RADIO FREQUENCY SUBSYSTEM 
The Radio Frequency Subsystem (RFS) allows for data transmissions at 
UHF 450 MHz for uplink, and S-band 2279 MHz. These uplink and downlink 
channels, respectively, provide full-duplex communication through nadir-pointing 
antennas. The RFS can relay the spacecraft’s sensor and performance data to 
ground stations located in Ohio, Utah, California, and Hawaii.  
To command the spacecraft while in orbit and retrieve subsystem 
information, NPSAT1 will leverage the Mobile CubeSat Command and Control 
(MC3) [37] network of ground stations. Developed to support the National 
Reconnaissance Office’s Colony program, the MC3’s network of ground stations 
make use of both UHF and S-Band telemetry systems to command over 
30 experimental spacecraft as they orbit and retrieve data. NPSAT1 operators 
will leverage the MC3’s architecture to remotely command the spacecraft and 
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provide a portal by which researchers and users can access experiment data 
across a secure web server. 
F. SPACECRAFT END OF LIFE 
U.S. regulations require that the NPSAT1 spacecraft be disposed of, 
either purposefully or naturally, no more than 25 years after its end of life [33]. 
Since the spacecraft will be launched into the LEO regime, both AFI 91–217 and 
DODI 3100.12 require NPSAT1 to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere; incinerating 
the spacecraft in the process. To satisfy this requirement, NPSAT1 will 
automatically deploy a NanoSat Terminator Tape (NSTT) 18 months after it 
separates from its launch vehicle. Once deployed, the deorbiting mechanism 
developed by Tethers Unlimited, Inc., will create enough aerodynamic drag to 
slow the satellite’s speed while on orbit. This loss in speed will ultimately alter the 
spacecraft’s trajectory in such a way that it reenters the Earth’s upper 
atmosphere, where it will be exposed to an increasing amount of drag. 
Throughout this process, the spacecraft will be exposed to enough drag to heat 
each component in such a way that NPSAT1 eventually will be incinerated. 
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V. REENTRY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
When calculating the potential for human casualties, DAS predicts the 
altitude of demise for each object based upon the material’s density, cross-
sectional area, and aerodynamic (thermal) mass. Once this analysis is complete, 
the results are then compared to the Requirement 4.7–1 within NASA Standard 
8719.14A. Any object that falls to Earth is then further analyzed to determine the 
energy by which it strikes and the expected number of human casualties as a 
result. If an item of debris is predicted to have greater than a 1:10,000 [24] 
chance of surviving the reentry process with an impacting energy of 15 joules or 
more [32], the spacecraft is deemed to be non-compliant by AFI 91–217 
standards. The operational concept of using the DAS program is that particular 
components that were determined to fail within the program’s logic require further 
analysis within the ORSAT software. 
A. TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The DAS software already contains several conservative values for the 
densities of commonly used materials such as Aluminum and Steel. In order to 
account for less common materials, the user is required to manually input the 
relevant data from their respective datasheets. The material density used for 
each of the materials involved in the design of NPSAT1 is described in Table 3, 
with the pre-existing values stored within DAS denoted in gray. 
Table 3.   NPSAT1 Material Properties Modeled within DAS 
Material Name Density (kg/m3) 
Polycarbonate (aka Lexan) 1250 [35] 
Delrin (Polyoxymethylene) 1420 [38] 
Viton A 1900 [39] 
Rulon J 1950 [40] 
Aluminum 6061-T6 2707 [35] 
GaAs 5316 [35] 
Steel AISI 304 7900 [35] 
Copper Alloy 8938 [35] 
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DAS operates under the assumption that once a parent structure  
ablates, the subcomponents are then exposed to the elements without prior bias 
(e.g., thermal transfer from the super-heating of its surrounding structures). 
Naturally, this is a more conservative approach, as the innards of a sub-
assembly would be exposed to heat from the ablation of the structure 
surrounding it; thus the altitude of demise for child objects is inherently lower. 
Navigating DAS’ peculiarities proved to be a significant effort so it is 
recommended that any attempt to replicate the work performed in this thesis 
should make use of the input data provided in Appendix A. 
B. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
To conservatively model the reentry of NPSAT1, 707 different components 
across 84 assemblies and sub-assemblies were measured with CAD software. 
After being categorized by mass, material, and geometry, like components were 
then grouped to satisfy DAS’ 200 component limit [36]. The resultant data was 
organized into a single-level hierarchy to evaluate the reentry sequence of 
NPSAT1. 
Once the data had been collated and reformatted for entry into DAS, the 
individual spacecraft components were run through the DAS reentry algorithms. 
Understanding that conservative geometries were applied to a significant portion 
of the satellite’s components, the first several iterations of the software would 
yield different component failures that were then further scrutinized to improve 
the geometric equivalence; taking into account both the overall dimensionality 
and relative shape of the original components. A dodecagonal plate, for example, 
could be entered into DAS as either a cylinder or as a flat rectangular plate. 
Entering that shape as a flat plate large enough to encompass the original 
component would be the most conservative approach. If this conservatism 
resulted in a failure, the geometry would be further reduced to either a cylinder or 
a flat plate as DAS allowed. In either case, the equivalent geometries would have 
identical surface areas, volume, and relative shape. The results of this analysis 
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conservatively indicate that while 19 overall fragments from NPSAT1 may survive 
reentry, the sum probability of casualties resultant from these fragments satisfies 
the requirements established in both AFI 91–217 and DODI 3100.12. Results 
from the analysis are illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Demise Altitude (MSL) of Debris by Component 
 
Figure 4 shows a linearly-scaled depiction of the demise altitude for each 
component within the NPSAT1 spacecraft relative to mean-sea-level (MSL). The 
data shown was sorted to illustrate the demise altitude in a descending pattern 
with each data point along the horizontal axis representing a specific component 
rather than a unit of time. The 19 components that fail to ablate upon reentry 
(highlighted in red) each strike the Earth with varying energies and predicted 
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Figure 5.  Predicted Impact Area of Debris by Component (m2) 
 
Each component that survived the reentry process, hereafter referred to 
as debris, will strike the surface of the Earth within a certain radius, or square-
area. Figure 5 enumerates the expected area of impact, per component, 
predicted by DAS. For each item of debris that survives atmospheric reentry, the 
item’s impact energy must be taken into account alongside its projected area of 
impact. When considering the reentry criteria for spacecraft debris set by AFI 91–
217, only two components exceeded 15 joules of energy; the force required to 
cause a human fatality. Figure 6 illustrates the calculated impact energy for each 
item of debris while specifically highlighting the two spacecraft components that 
would exceed an impacting energy greater or equal to 15 Joules. 























Figure 6.  Predicted Energy (J) of Impact by Component 
 
Logarithmically scaled, Figure 6 depicts the Kinetic Energy (or Impact 
Energy) transferred by each object that survived the reentry process. Three 
values are highlighted to draw attention to their significance: an Electromagnetic 
Interference (EMI) Enclosure Lid, a few steel backshells belonging to cables that 
attach to the overall EMI enclosure, and two air coil wires contained within the 
ACS assembly. The EMI enclosure exhibits only 14 Joules on impact, placing the 
component just below the 15 joule requirement. The other components 
highlighted exhibit 33 Joules and 1294 Joules, respectively. Given the calculated 
probability of a human fatality being 1:14,500, NPSAT1 is fully compliant with 
both AFI 91–217 and DODI 3100.12 requirements for a spacecraft undergoing 
atmospheric disposal or reentry. 
EMI Shield / Enclosure Lid
(CDH Subsystem - [0.142 kg] 
Steel AISI 304), 14
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(CDH Subsystem - [0.05 kg] 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ATMOSPHERIC REENTRY OF NPSAT1 
Standing under a meter tall and weighing only 90 kg (originally predicted 
to be 82 kg), the initial expectation was that each of the spacecraft’s components 
would ablate upon atmospheric reentry. On the contrary, 19 of the 707 different 
pieces composing NPSAT1 failed to ablate during the reentry process. Upon 
inspection, only two of these components yielded an energy and impact area 
great enough to warrant review: the copper air coil wires designed into the 
Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS) and several cable backshells implemented to 
help protect the spacecraft from electromagnetic interference (EMI).  
The ACS assembly’s air coil wires (seen in Figure 7), or torquer coils, use 
the magnetic field emanated from the Earth to point the spacecraft toward Earth. 
Each of the three 1.395 kg air coil wires on NPSAT1 consist 37 layers of 
wrapped copper wire, resembling a large solenoid. Between their core and 
insulations, these wires are approximately 0.370 millimeter in diameter and are 
wrapped around the housing 68 times, or turns, per layer. To model this 
component’s reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere using DAS, the operator must 
either reduce the structure to a simple cylinder or a flat plate of strewn wire; each 
introducing a significant amount of error. Though DAS predicts that these coiled 
wires will survive reentry, it is more probable that these copper wires will unwind 
during the reentry process as their insulation is melted. This action would expose 
the wires to significantly greater stress during atmospheric reentry and would 
most likely end in their complete ablation. It should be noted that neither the air 
coil wire’s housing (Figure 7) nor their electrical connections were predicted to 




Figure 7.  Picture of the Integrated Air Coil Wire (ACS Assembly) 
Source: This image was provided courtesy of Daniel Sakoda of the Space 
Systems Academic Group of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
The other component that was predicted to survive reentry are the EMI 
backshells directly connected to the Command and Data Handler (CDH). These 
EMI backshells (illustrated in Figure 8), are made of thin stainless steel to 
prevent electromagnetic energy from entering or exiting the cable; interfering with 
sensor and data readings. The prediction of these components surviving reentry 
with a kinetic energy exceeding 15 J was surprising as they have a thermal mass 
of 0.05 kg. These backshells are milled from a solid piece of metal to create a 
hollow void for cables when assembled. Modeling this component requires the 
operator to reduce the overall structure to either a box or to a flat plate by which 
all of the sides have been flattened outward. 
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Figure 8.  Picture of the EMI Backshell (CDH Flight Assembly) 
Source: This image was provided courtesy of Daniel Sakoda of the Space 
Systems Academic Group of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Addressing the risk of any component surviving atmospheric reentry 
requires both practicality and conservative modeling. When considering the 
circumstances by which these components will reenter, it is apparent that the 
predictions given by DAS are highly conservative in nature. Though 19 pieces of 
NPSAT1 were ultimately predicted to survive, DAS calculated that the risk to 
human casualty from an uncontrolled reentry was 1:14,500, clearly compliant 
with Requirement 5.7.3.1.1.1 of AFI 91–217 and Requirement 6.4.1 of DODI 
3100.12. 
B. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Only 5% of the objects currently being tracked in space are operational 
spacecraft. With each new launch, the probability of a spacecraft colliding with 
nearby orbital debris increases. Besides the risk to the mission itself, a collision 
between fragmented debris, expended rocket body, or orbiting spacecraft could 
result in the generation of thousands more items of debris. The U.S. requirement 
to dispose of non-operational spacecraft, either through atmospheric reentry or 
through a disposal orbit, helps to mitigate this risk. For spacecraft reentering the 
Earth’s atmosphere, additional modeling needs to be performed to ensure the 
safety of the human population below.  
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Though NPSAT1 is in full compliance with U.S. regulations governing 
reentering spacecraft, this paper identifies two areas for further research. Given 
that the primary mission of NPSAT1 is educate students, comparing the modeled 
reentry of the two components highlighted in this paper with predictions made in 
ORSAT would aid the Space Systems Academic Group in understanding the true 
demise altitudes of these components. Additionally, an analysis of whether DAS, 
given its conservative nature and limitations, is an effective tool for predicting the 







APPENDIX A. DAS REENTRY INPUT FILE 
The following table contains the information necessary to replicate the 
work performed in this paper. Appropriately formatted and grouped, the contents 
of this file can be stored as a comma-separated-value (CSV) file that can be 
imported into NASA’s Debris Assessment Software (DAS). One of the principle 
limitations of the DAS program is the number of components allowed to comprise 
the spacecraft. To reduce the 707 components that constitute NPSAT1, like 
components were grouped and then further categorized by composition, 
geometry, and thermal mass. Though DAS does not require the input file to have 
a particular name, Table 2 must be saved as a separate CSV file titled, 
“matprop.csv,” in the project’s root folder to make use of the data in Table 4. 
. 
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APPENDIX B. COMBINED SDAR/EOLP FORMAT DESCRIPTION 
The following table summarized the individual sections specified by 
Requirement 5.4.4.1 of AFI 91–217. The intent of this information is to provide a 
general understanding of the document, the information it contains, and its 
context within the mission. Draft documents are typically submitted 30 to 45 days 
in advance of key mission milestones (such as the Preliminary Design Review 
and the Critical Design Review) but the final revision of the SDAR/EOLP must be 
submitted 30 days prior to beginning the launch approval process. 
Table 5.   Combined SDAR/EOLP Format Description 
Summary of the Combined Spacecraft Debris Assessment Report / 
End-of-Life Plan 
Section Summarized Content 
 
Cover and Front 
Matter 
 
The cover and opening pages of the document contain 
information regarding the document’s version, who the 
signature authorities are, and the level of sensitivity 
required for handling the data contained within the 









This section identifies the program sponsoring the mission, 
who the program manager is, and lists all of the mission 
partners. 
 
Both design and program schedules are included along with 
milestones identified throughout the projected launch date. 
A separate schedule for operational milestones from launch 
to the spacecraft’s end-of-life is also included. 
 
 
An overview of the spacecraft’s mission, design, and launch 
parameters are included along with orbital parameters. 
These details include data such as the program’s 




A topical summary of the spacecraft’s overall compliance 
with the debris mitigation requirements specified by DODI 
3100.12 and AFI 91–217. Any object expected to be 
released throughout the spacecraft’s lifetime is also listed in 
this section so long as the object has a diameter greater 







Section 2 is the primary chapter within the combined 
SDAR/EOLP that provides the reader with a detailed 
description of the spacecraft. With discrete topics ranging 
from the spacecraft’s dry (empty) and wet (fully fueled) 
masses to attitude control mechanisms.  
 
Not every program will have the systems or components 
that are required to be identified by AFI 91–217. For 
example, most spacecraft will not have radioactive 
materials on-board and smaller spacecraft (namely micro-
satellites) will not have propulsion systems to save space. 
 
The spacecraft description is always accompanied by a 








Released on Orbit 
 
Much like Section 2, there will be several satellites that do 
not expect to release a single item of debris during 
operation or at the spacecraft’s end-of-life.  
 
If a program does expect to release components into space 
during the mission, those objects with a diameter greater 
than 5 mm are expected to be identified. This list should 
also include the object’s dimensions, mass, and material 
composition. 
 
For each identified object, the rationale behind the object’s 
release is required; adding with it the velocity by which the 
object will be released, it’s projected orbital trajectory, and 
estimated time of release. 
 
A detailed summary of the spacecraft’s compliance with the 













This section aims to provide the reader with a detailed 
summary of planned breakups (such as atmospheric 
reentry) and every realistic failure mode that could result in 
the spacecraft exploding.   
 
Passivation measures, or the act of depleting the spacecraft 
of all stored energy, and the components identified for 
passivation are also described in this section. If a 
component on the spacecraft requires passivation but there 
isn’t a designed method to achieve it, those components 
need to be identified. Similar to the Section 3, the reason 
why these components are unable to be passivated along 
with the design rationale behind the reason need to be 
addressed. 
 
A detailed summary of the spacecraft’s compliance with the 









Section 5, aims to identify the probability of a collisions on 
orbit. Aside from listing all of the components required to 
perform mission disposal this section mostly requires the 
use of the Debris Assessment Software (DAS). Though the 
software was designed for use in NASA missions, AFI-217 
references it directly for these calculations. 
 
The probabilities that the spacecraft will either collide with a 
known object larger than 10 cm in diameter or an object 
large enough to end the mission are both required. The 
results of these calculations are required along with an 
assessment of spacecraft’s compliance with relevant 










In this section, the reliability of any post-mission disposal 
operation is considered along with detailed plans for 
passivation and an overview of the disposal method 
chosen.  
 
If atmospheric reentry is not the chosen disposal method for 
the spacecraft, the expected area-to-mass ratio of the 




A detailed summary of the spacecraft’s compliance with the 









This section requires each component within the spacecraft 
to be described though their individual dimensions, thermal 
mass, and material composition. The general shapes of 
these components are also required if the spacecraft will 
undergo atmospheric reentry.  
 
Similar to Section 5, the data specifically required by this 
section can be imported into either the Debris Assessment 
Software or another tool, Object Reentry Survival Analysis 
Tool (ORSAT); both designed by NASA. 
 
Through either modeling program, the probability of human 
casualty resulting from a component reentering the 
atmosphere can be calculated. 
 
The results of these calculations are required along with an 
assessment of spacecraft’s compliance with the relevant 





Tether Missions  
 
Spacecraft that employ a tether must describe the type and 
design of the system. Information regarding the size of an 
object required to sever the tether, the lifetime on-orbit that 
a severed tether could survive, and the overall mission plan 
for the tether are all required. 
 
A detailed summary of the spacecraft’s compliance with the 






Reference List  
 
The last section of the combined SDAR/EOLP gives the 
reader access to the technical data and resources used to 
author the document or perform the necessary calculations. 
 
 57
APPENDIX C. TWO LINE ELEMENT (TLE) DESCRIPTION 
The Two-Line-Element (TLE) format is the main entry format used by the 
United States for cataloging spacecraft and man-made objects in space. Figure 
10 details the meaning behind each of the values contained within a TLE entry. 
This reference can be used to understand the data present in the TLE entry for 
NOAA 14 (Table 1). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Two Line Element (TLE) Format Description 
Source [5]: Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris, NASA-HDBK-8719.14, NASA, 
Washington, DC, 2008, pp. 42–59. 
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APPENDIX D. COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S. AIR FORCE AND 
NASA REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO DAS 
The Debris Assessment Software (DAS) was designed for NASA mission 
planners to quickly determine whether their spacecraft was fully compliant. The 
metric of being compliant is determined through ten different tool sets, or models, 
within DAS. Each model computes spacecraft specific data, entered into by the 
operator, against one of the requirements levied by NASA-STD-8719.14A. Given 
the utility of this tool, the following comparison aims to help military spacecraft 
programs quickly reference their compliance with AFI 91–217 through the use of 
DAS. The following table compares the compliance requirements by both 
agencies side by side as they relate to the ten different computational tools in 
DAS. 
Table 6.   DAS Compliance Analysis 
DAS Compliance Analysis by Requirement 
Relevant NASA-STD-8719.14A 
Requirement [32] 
Equivalent AFI 91–217 
Requirement [24] 
Mission-Related Debris Passing Through LEO 
 
Requirement 4.3–1: Debris passing 
through LEO - released debris with 
diameters of 1mm or larger: 
 
Requirement 4.3–1a: All debris released 
during the deployment, operation, and 
disposal phases shall be limited to a 
maximum orbital lifetime of 25 years from 
date of release (Requirement 56398). 
 
Requirement 4.3–1b: The total object-time 
product shall be no larger than 100 object-
years per mission (Requirement 56399). 
The object-time product is the sum of all 
debris of the total time spent below 2,000 
km altitude during the orbital lifetime of 
 
5.4.5.1. Debris passing through 
Low-Earth Orbit (LEO). For 
missions leaving debris in orbits 
passing through LEO, released 
debris with diameters of 5 mm or 
larger shall have maximum orbital 
lifetimes of 25 years from date of 
release. The total object-time 
product shall not exceed 100 
object-years per mission. The 
object-time product is the sum 
over all debris of the total time 
spent below 2000 km altitude 





Mission-Related Debris Passing Near GEO 
 
Requirement 4.3–2: Debris passing near 
GEO: 
 
For missions leaving debris in orbits with 
the potential of traversing GEO (GEO 
altitude +/- 200 km and +/- 15 degrees 
latitude), released debris with diameters of 
5 cm or greater shall be left in orbits which 
will ensure that within 25 years after 
release the apogee will no longer exceed 
GEO - 200 km (Requirement 56400). 
 
5.4.5.2. Debris passing near 
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO). 
For missions leaving debris in 
orbits with the potential of 
traversing GEO (GEO altitude +/- 
200 km and +/- 15 degrees 
latitude), released debris with 
diameters of 5 cm or greater shall 
be left in orbits which will ensure 
that within 25 years after release 
the apogee will no longer exceed 
GEO - 200 km. Reference NASA-
STD-8719.14. 
 
Long-Term Risk from Planned Breakups 
 
Requirement 4.4–3. Limiting the long-term 
risk to other space systems from planned 
breakups: Planned explosions or 
intentional collisions shall: 
 
a. Be conducted at an altitude such that for 
orbital debris fragments larger than 10 cm 
the object-time product does not exceed 
100 object-years (Requirement 56453). For 
example, if the debris fragments greater 
than 10cm decay in the maximum allowed 
1 year, a maximum of 100 such fragments 
can be generated by the breakup. 
 
b. Not generate debris larger than 1 mm 
that remains in Earth orbit longer than one 
year (Requirement 56454). 
 
5.4.7.1. Planned explosions or 
intentional collisions shall occur 
at altitudes such that, for orbital 
debris fragments larger than 10 
cm, the object-time product does 
not exceed 100 object-years. No 
debris larger than 1 mm shall 
remain in Earth orbit longer than 
1 year. Reference NASA-STD-
8719.14A. 
 
5.4.7.2. Immediately before a 
planned explosion or intentional 
collision, the probability of related 
debris larger than 1 mm colliding 
with any active spacecraft within 
24 hours of the breakup shall not 
exceed 1 10–6 (one in one 
million). Reference NASA-STD 
8719.14A. 
 
Probability of Collision with Large Objects 
 
Requirement 4.5–1. Limiting debris 
generated by collisions with large objects 
when operating in Earth orbit: For each 
 
5.4.8.1. Collisions with Large 
Objects. Programs shall 
demonstrate that, during the 
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spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stage 
in or passing through LEO, the program or 
project shall demonstrate that, during the 
orbital lifetime of each spacecraft and 
orbital stage, the probability of accidental 
collision with space objects larger than 10 




orbital lifetime of each spacecraft 
or launch vehicle component in or 
passing through LEO, the 
probability of accidental collision 
with space objects larger than 10 
cm in diameter is less than 1 10–
3 (one in one thousand). 
Reference NASA-STD 8719.14. 
Probability of Damage from Small Objects 
 
Requirement 4.5–2. Limiting debris 
generated by collisions with small objects 
when operating in Earth or lunar orbit:  
 
For each spacecraft, the program or 
project shall demonstrate that, during the 
mission of the spacecraft, the probability of 
accidental collision with orbital debris and 
meteoroids sufficient to prevent 
compliance with the applicable postmission 




5.4.8.2. Collisions with Small 
Objects. Programs shall 
demonstrate that, during the 
mission of the space system, the 
probability of accidental collision 
with objects (including space 
debris and meteoroids) sufficient 
to prevent post-mission disposal 





Requirement 4.6–1. Disposal for space 
structures in or passing through LEO:  
 
A spacecraft or orbital stage with a perigee 
altitude below 2,000 km shall be disposed 
of by one of the following three methods: 
(Requirement 56557) 
 
a. Atmospheric reentry option: 
• Leave the space structure in an orbit in 
which natural forces will lead to 
atmospheric reentry within 25 years after 
the completion of mission but no more than 
30 years after launch; or 
• Maneuver the space structure into a 
controlled de-orbit trajectory as soon as 




Atmospheric Reentry. Leave the 
spacecraft or launch vehicle 
component in an orbit in which 
natural forces will lead to 
atmospheric reentry within 25 
years after the end of mission. 
 
5.7.3.2.1. When selecting 
disposal orbits, operators shall 
account for spacecraft area/mass 
ratio and the effect of future 
orbital drift due to gravitational 
perturbations and other space 
environmental effects. Due to fuel 
gauging uncertainties near the 
end of mission, use a maneuver 
strategy that has the least risk of 
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b. Storage orbit option: Maneuver the 
space structure into an orbit with perigee 
altitude greater than 2000 km and apogee 
less than GEO - 500 km. 
 
c. Direct retrieval: Retrieve the space 
structure and remove it from orbit within 10 
years after completion of mission. 
 
Requirement 4.6–2. Disposal for space 
structures near GEO: A spacecraft or 
orbital stage in an orbit near GEO shall be 
maneuvered at EOM to a disposal orbit 
above GEO with a predicted minimum 
perigee of GEO +200 km (35,986 km) or 
below GEO with an apogee of GEO—200 
km (35,586 km) for a period of at least 100 
years after disposal (Requirement 56563). 
 
Requirement 4.6–3. Disposal for space 
structures between LEO and GEO: 
 
a. A spacecraft or orbital stage shall be left 
in an orbit with a perigee greater than 2000 
km above the Earth’s surface and apogee 
less than 500 km below GEO 
(Requirement 56565). 
 
b. A spacecraft or orbital stage shall not 
use nearly circular disposal orbits near 
regions of high value operational space 
structures, such as between 19,200 km 
and 20,700 km (Requirement 56566). 
 
 
leaving the structure near an 
operational orbit regime. 
 
5.7.3.3. Direct retrieval. Direct 
retrieval strategies shall comply 
with all disposal requirements in 
this AFI and in the ODMSP. 
Casualty Risk from Reentry Debris 
 
Requirement 4.7–1. Limit the risk of human 
casualty: 
 
The potential for human casualty is 
assumed for any object with an impacting 
kinetic energy in excess of 15 joules: 
 
a. For uncontrolled reentry, the risk of 
 
5.7.3.1.1.1. The collective risk to 
the general public due to 
uncontrolled atmospheric reentry 
shall not exceed a casualty 
expectation (Ec) of 100 x 10–6 
(one hundred in one million). 
 
5.7.3.1.2. Controlled Atmospheric 
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human casualty from surviving debris shall 
not exceed 0.0001 (1:10,000) 
(Requirement 56626). 
 
b. For controlled reentry, the selected 
trajectory shall ensure that no surviving 
debris impact with a kinetic energy greater 
than 15 joules is closer than 370 km from 
foreign landmasses, or is within 50 km 
from the continental U.S., territories of the 
U.S., and the permanent ice pack of 
Antarctica (Requirement 56627). 
 
c. For controlled reentries, the product of 
the probability of failure of the reentry burn 
(from Requirement 4.6–4.b) and the risk of 
human casualty assuming uncontrolled 
reentry shall not exceed 0.0001 (1:10,000) 
(Requirement 56628). 
 
Reentry. For controlled reentry of 
any orbiting object, the selected 
trajectory shall comply with the 
requirements in Section 4.6. 
 
4.6.3.1. Public. The risk to the 
general public shall not exceed 
an individual Probability of 
Casualty (Pc) of 1 x 10–6 (one in 
one million), and the collective 
risk to the general public shall not 
exceed a casualty expectation 
(Ec) of 100 x 10–6 (one hundred 
in one million). Each major 
component of a mission shall 
have a separate risk budget (e.g., 
upper stage allocated 100 10–6 
and the spacecraft allocated 100 
10–6). Reference RCC 321. 
Collision Hazards of Space Tethers 
 
Requirement 4.8–1. Mitigate the collision 
hazards of space tethers in Earth or Lunar 
orbits:  
 
Intact and remnants of severed tether 
systems in Earth and lunar orbit shall meet 
the requirements limiting the generation of 
orbital debris from on-orbit collisions 
(Requirements 4.5–1 and 4.5–2) and the 
requirements governing postmission 
disposal (Requirements 4.6–1 through 4.6–
4) to the limits specified in those 
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